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What Prohibition Teaches About Guns and 
Abortion: How Alcohol Can Save Individual Rights 
 
Jesse D.H. Snyder* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
David Bowie once reflected, whether we like it or not, whether we 
know it or not, time changes us all: “Time may change me.  But you can’t 
trace time.”1  A women’s right to terminate a pregnancy through abortion 
and the right to bear arms are two sides of the same coin because of time.  
The rights are polarizing with dissimilar footholds in the Constitution.  
Those in favor of one right are generally opposed to the other right.2  Yet 
because they are individual rights recognized by the Supreme Court, they 
are entwined like a double helix, resisting repulsion under a latent precept:  
reliance.  In 1973, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court prescribed the right 
for women to choose to terminate their pregnancies through abortion.3  
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey reaffirmed that 
individual right in 1992,4 and Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt did the 
same in 2016.5  This unenumerated right rests in the Due Process Clause of 
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 1. DAVID BOWIE, Changes, on HUNKY DORY (Trident Studies 1972). 
 2. See, e.g., Amy Howe, Last night’s presidential debate: The Supreme Court and the 
candidates, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 20, 2016, 11:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2016/10/last-nights-presidential-debate-the-supreme-court-and-the-candidates/. 
 3.  Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for law students: Roe v. Wade and 
precedent, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 2, 2016, 1:55 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/12/ 
scotus-for-law-students-roe-v-wade-and-precedent/; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 
(1973).   
 4. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(citations omitted). 
 5. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). 
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the Fourteenth Amendment.6  In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 
the Supreme Court concluded that an individual has the right to possess a 
handgun in the home for self-defense.7  In 2010, McDonald v. City of 
Chicago applied that individual right against the states.8  The right to bear 
arms is, of course, housed in the Second Amendment.9  Although the two 
rights may seem discordant, like all individual rights recognized by the 
Supreme Court, they derive value and meaning by affording an individual 
the ability to push back against state action in derogation of those rights.  
The creation and enablement of an individual right gives rise to reliance 
that that right will endure among the oscillating panoply of other rights 
already dedicated to the public.10   
Doubtless the Supreme Court can overrule constitutional precedent, but 
a study of jurisprudence in the area of individual rights reveals scant 
decisions that recognized an individual right and then scuttled expectations 
by expunging that right from the public.11  If the Supreme Court were to 
consider negating the rights recognized in Roe and Heller, it must contend 
with the due-process consequences of upsetting the settled expectations of 
individuals.12  Advocates in favor of either Roe or Heller have the 
challenge of explaining how excising individual rights impacts society writ 
large.  Proponents of individual rights must be creative, directing the 
Court’s attention to extrajudicial sources amid a dearth of apposite judicial 
decisions.  And for that, Prohibition offers a glimpse into a world laboring 
in the absence of a once-recognized right.  How society behaved during the 
only time a constitutional amendment was ratified and then repealed is 
instructive of what might happen if gun or abortion rights vanish.13 
This paper argues that advocates should use the documented history of 
Prohibition to argue why courts should be circumspect before overruling 
decisions recognizing individual rights.  In three parts, the paper outlines 
how the 2016 presidential election stirred frisson among proponents and 
 
 6. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. (“Constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to 
terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”) 
 7. Amy Howe, Last night’s presidential debate: The Supreme Court and the candidates, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 20, 2016, 11:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/10/last-nights-
presidential-debate-the-supreme-court-and-the-candidates/; District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 8. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (controlling opinion). 
 9. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“In sum, we hold that the 
District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does 
its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of 
immediate self-defense.”). 
 10. Akhil Amar, The Court after Scalia: The despicable and dispensable exclusionary 
rule (Corrected), SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 16, 2016, 1:57 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-the-despicable-and-dispensable-exclusionary-rule/. 
 11. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861–63 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). 
 12. See Amar, supra, note 10.  
 13. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, with U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.    
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opponents of abortion and gun rights, discusses how Prohibition is apt 
when considering the effects of curtailing individual rights, and concludes 
by asserting that due process requires courts to adhere to precedent when 
individuals develop a reliance interest on recognized individual rights.  In 
the end, alcohol may be the elixir that saves abortion and gun rights.         
II. THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND THE 
WEAPONIZING OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
Court opinions on gun control and access to abortion procedures are 
politicized issues that never seem to settle.14  Inveighers against those rights 
most likely take comfort in Justice Louis D. Brandeis’s remarks that “no 
case is ever finally decided until it is rightly decided.”15  But this position 
begs the question of when can individuals ever feel secure in recognized 
individual rights when each new justice on the Supreme Court invites “a 
[renewed] battle for the meaning of the Constitution”?16  Unlike abortion 
and gun control, same-sex marriage, interestingly, seems secure even 
though disagreement persists on its legal firmness.17  
Roe and Heller transcend normative voting issues.  The decisions have 
fomented advocacy groups and million-dollar industries dedicated to the 
preservation or eradication of the rights those cases have come to 
represent.18  Money goes, in part, to persuade voters why one cause is 
virtuous and the other leads to bedlam.19  The perception that Roe and 
Heller are fragile is buttressed by expenditures:  causes attempting to 
persuade that either decision is correct outspend causes attempting to 
undermine the recognized right.20   
Parsing the legal reasons that moor the recognition of the right to own a 
handgun in the home for self-defense and the right to terminate a 
 
 14. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Constitution Check: Might the Supreme Court overrule its 
own gun rights ruling? NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER (Sept. 22, 2016), http://blog. 
constitutioncenter.org/2016/09/constitution-check-might-the-supreme-court-overrule-its-
own-gun-rights-ruling/; See Wermiel, supra, note 3.   
 15. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 223 (1952) (quoting Justice Brandeis that “no case is ever finally decided until it is 
rightly decided”). 
 16.  Michael Dorf, Symposium: The wages of guerrilla warfare against 
abortion, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2016, 5:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/ 
symposium-the-wages-of-guerrilla-warfare-against-abortion/. 
 17. See Wermiel, supra, note 3; Ryan Anderson, Symposium: Judicial activism on 
marriage causes harm: What does the future hold?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2015, 4:28 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-ryan-anderson/. 
 18. See, e.g., Suevon Lee, By the Numbers: Comparing Spending by Gun Rights and Gun 
Control Interest Groups, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 31, 2012, 8.59 AM), https://www.pro 
publica.org/article/by-the-numbers-comparing-spending-by-gun-rights-and-gun-control-
interest-gr; Steven Ertelt, $37M Spent on Election Abortion Ads, Pro-Lifers Outspent 3-1, 
LIFENEWS.COM (Nov. 15, 2012, 4:16 PM), http://www.lifenews.com/2012/11/15/37m-spent-
on-election-abortion-ads-pro-lifers-outspent-3-1/.  
 19. Id.   
 20. See, supra, note 18.   
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pregnancy through abortion does not explain in full why people care about 
these issues.  Commentators suggest that, although progressives would 
much like to overturn Heller, their chief aim is to restrict access to weapons 
as a means to promote public safety.21  To them, Heller threatens the 
prospect of a safe society irrespective of whether the right to bear arms has 
a foothold as a collective right or individual right.22  As for a woman’s right 
to an abortion, commentators likewise conclude that “Roe’s continued 
uncertain status as settled precedent must lie outside legal reasoning”: 
Many commentators have observed that a variety of interest groups 
have gained and exerted political traction by using the issue of 
abortion as an organizing principle and rallying point.  The 
intersection of anti-abortion political movements with pro-life 
moral values and religious teachings by the Catholic Church and 
others may have added to the power of the issue as a political 
rallying cry.  A number of state legislatures have stoked the debate 
over abortion rights by annually passing new abortion restrictions 
or even partial or near-total bans, some clearly designed as vehicles 
for the court to reconsider Roe.23 
Public disagreement with Roe and Heller is not so much about 
constitutional law as it is about extrajudicial values. 
During the 2016 presidential election, those two rights received 
outsized attention.24  Amid the omnipresent vacancy on the Supreme Court, 
both candidates used the rights as unexpurgated rallying cries, suggesting 
that the election will secure the vitality of one right and presage the demise 
of the other.25  Scholars feared the same: 
If Justice Scalia is replaced by someone who favors abortion rights, 
Roe v. Wade will be more secure than it has been in decades.  If 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kennedy are replaced by Hillary 
Clinton, abortion rights will be protected for decades to come and 
the court likely will revisit some of its rulings that allowed 
restrictions on abortions.  But conversely, if even two of these four 
seats are replaced by Donald Trump, it seems certain that there 
would be five votes to greatly limit abortion rights and I believe to 
overrule Roe v. Wade.   
 
 21. See Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION 
CENTER, https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-ii/ 
the-reasonable-right-to-bear-arms-adam-winkler/interp/2 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
 22. See id.; Cass R. Sunstein, The Refounding Father, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 
(June 5, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/06/05/justice-stevens-refounding-
father/. 
 23. See Wermiel, supra, note 3. 
 24. Howe, supra, note 7.  
 25. Id.   
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. . . . 
Again, the current court is likely split 4-4 on the meaning of the 
Second Amendment.  A Hillary Clinton victory would mean a 
court that is unlikely to extend gun rights and very well might 
overrule Heller and McDonald.  A Donald Trump presidency 
would create a court committed to these decisions and would be 
likely to strike down many other laws regulating firearms.26 
But is fear a justifiable response?  Is one right guaranteed to ascend, while 
the other is consigned to an inflection point toward demise?  Certainly, the 
Supreme Court can overrule precedent.  Still, in 239 years, the Court has 
overruled one of its constitutional decisions only 95 times.27  Instances 
when the Court purged an individual right are vanishing small.  
III. WHAT PROHIBITION, MORE THAN ANY COURT 
DECISION, TEACHES ABOUT INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS   
Prohibition—not prior decisions—serves as the most appropriate 
model of what would happen if the Supreme Court overruled Roe or Heller.  
When the Court last scrutinized whether an individual right should be 
overruled in favor of state legislation, it could muster only two cases to 
demonstrate how widespread debate undermined past legitimacy:  Lochner 
v. New York and Plessy v. Ferguson.28   
Lochner “imposed substantive limitations on legislation limiting 
economic autonomy in favor of health and welfare regulation.”29  When the 
Court overruled the substantive right to contract, the right was hardly an 
individual right because collective institutions used Lochner as a means to 
propagate unregulated, profit-maximizing behavior to the detriment of 
social welfare.30  Lochner stood more for inhibiting regulation than for 
enabling individuals the freedom to contract.  No uprisings about the loss 
of the right to contract occurred because individual welfare, in the Court’s 
view, depended on some market regulation.31   
Plessy implicated the infamous “separate-but-equal rule for applying 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.”32  As the Court 
reflected, “whatever may have been the understanding in Plessy’s time of 
 
 26. Erwin Chemerinski, Chemerinsky: What will the presidential election mean for 
SCOTUS?, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 6, 2016, 7:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/chemerinsky_what_will_the_coming_election_mean_for_scotus. 
 27. Lyle Denniston, Constitution Check: Might the Supreme Court overrule its own gun 
rights ruling?, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER (Sept. 22, 2016), http://blog.constitution 
center.org/2016/09/constitution-check-might-the-supreme-court-overrule-its-own-gun-
rights-ruling/. 
 28. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861–62.  
 29. Id. at 861 (citation omitted).   
 30. Id. (citation omitted).   
 31. Casey, 505 U.S at 862 (citation omitted).   
 32. Id. (citation omitted).   
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the power of segregation to stigmatize those who were segregated with a 
‘badge of inferiority,’ it was clear by 1954 that legally sanctioned 
segregation had just such an effect, to the point that racially separate public 
educational facilities were deemed inherently unequal.”33  Plessy is 
anathema to individual rights, elevating collective-institutional 
justifications for segregation in denigration of the rights secured through 
the Reconstruction Amendments.   
The aftermath of Lochner and Plessy had nothing to do with 
individuals coping with a loss of recognized rights; those cases represented 
improvement of individual rights.  In the absence of case law evidencing 
what happens when a recognized right is removed from the public, 
Prohibition is an exemplar for when the public enjoys a right later taken 
away.   
During the 1820s, a wave of religious revivalism ignited the 
temperance movement.34  In 1838, Massachusetts passed a temperance law 
banning the sale of spirits in less than 15-gallon quantities.35  Maine passed 
the first state prohibition law in 1846, and several states followed suit by 
the time the Civil War began in 1861.36 
The temperance movement gained momentum after the Civil War, 
avowing to fight “the perceived evils linked with alcoholic beverages.”37  
In 1880, Kansas became the first state to pass a constitutional provision that 
prohibited the production and sale of alcohol.38  The Supreme Court upheld 
the law because “it is not a determination for the courts, upon their views as 
to what is best and safest for the community, to disregard the legislative 
determination on that question.”39  In 1888, the Court narrowed that 
decision through the Commerce Clause, holding that states could not 
regulate liquor sales unless and until transportation of the liquor terminated 
in that forum.40  In 1890, Congress responded by passing the Wilson Act, 
which gave states the power to regulate the importation of liquor to the 
same degree as they regulated in-state liquor: 
All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids 
transported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, 
 
 33. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863 (citation omitted).   
 34. Prohibition, HISTORY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.history.com/topics/prohibition. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.   
 37. Autumn R. Veatch, Comment, Where Does the Commerce Clause End and the 
Twenty-first Amendment Begin Under Bainbridge v. Turner?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 111, 
116 (2004). 
 38.  See Russ Miller, Note, The Wine is in the Mail: The Twenty-first Amendment and 
State Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2495, 
2504 (2001). 
 39. Matthew B. Mills, Note, Let History Be Our Guide: Using Historical Analogies to 
Analyze State Response to a Post-Granholm Era, 81 IND. L.J. 1097, 1100 (2006) (citations 
omitted).   
 40. Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 499 (1888). 
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consumption, sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such 
State or Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws 
of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police 
powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such 
liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and 
shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced 
therein in original packages or otherwise.41 
Eight years later, the Supreme Court again scuttled Congress’s efforts, 
concluding that the Wilson Act did not cover mail-order alcohol.42  As a 
result, “[m]ail order booze, of course, flourished.”43  Temperance advocates 
remained undeterred, persuading Congress in 1913 to pass the Webb-
Kenyon Act, which prohibited the importation of liquor into any state with 
the intent to violate the laws of that state.44  The Webb-Kenyon Act struck 
similar tones with what became Section two of the Eighteenth Amendment: 
The shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means 
whatsoever, of any . . . intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one 
State . . . into any other State . . . or from any foreign country into 
any State . . . which said . . . intoxicating liquor is intended, by any 
person interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any 
manner used . . . in violation of any law of such State . . . is hereby 
prohibited.45 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act in 1917, 
two years before the beginning of nationalized Prohibition.46  By that point, 
World War I had exacerbated xenophobia against the German brewing 
industry, leading one temperance politician to exclaim, “And the worst of 
all our German enemies, the most treacherous, the most menacing, are 
Pabst, Schlitz, Blatz and Miller.”47 
Ratified on January 16, 1919, the Eighteenth Amendment prohibited 
the making, transporting, and selling of alcoholic beverages.48  Proponents 
of the movement, in a manner eerily similar to the advocacy against Roe 
and Heller, exhorted that temperance would reduce crime and corruption, 
 
 41. Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2002)). 
 42. Jason E. Prince, Note, New Wine in Old Wineskins: Analyzing State Direct-Shipment 
Laws in the Context of Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-first 
Amendment, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1563, 1569 (2004) (citation omitted).   
 43. See id. at 1569.     
 44. Webb-Kenyon Act, Pub. L. No. 68-398, 37 Stat. 699 (1913). 
 45. Compare id., with U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2.   
 46. James S. Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917). 
 47. Evan Andrews, 10 Things You Should Know About Prohibition, HISTORY (Jan. 16, 
2015), http://www.history.com/news/10-things-you-should-know-about-prohibition. 
 48. Annenberg Classroom, Prohibition of Liquor, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER, 
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-xviii (last 
visited on Dec. 13, 2016); U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.   
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decrease the need for welfare and prisons, and improve the health and 
welfare of Americans.49   
Agitation for repeal sparked “almost from the time [the Eighteenth 
Amendment] was adopted.”50  Accounts attribute the Eighteenth 
Amendment to driving underground the lucrative alcohol business, creating 
a pervasive black market.51  According to some reports, “[i]t was only 
slightly more difficult to buy liquor under Prohibition than it had been prior 
to its passage.”52  Evidence shows that Prohibition encouraged disrespect 
for the law and strengthened organized crime.53  Several states refused to 
enforce the Eighteenth Amendment.54  New York City boasted more than 
30,000 speakeasies, and Detroit’s alcohol trade was second only to the auto 
industry in contribution to its economy.55  Chicago gangster Al Capone 
earned $60 million annually from bootleg operations and speakeasies.56  
Illegal operations fueled a corresponding rise in gang violence, including 
the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre in Chicago in 1929, in which several men 
dressed as policemen killed a group from an enemy gang.57 
Against gangsters bootlegging and concomitant government 
corruption, President Warren G. Harding declared that Prohibition had 
devolved into a “nationwide scandal.”58  The upshot of Prohibition 
included its disproportionate effect on the nation’s working class and poor 
because the high price of bootleg liquor margined out all but middle- and 
upper-class Americans.59  Costs for law enforcement, jails, and prisons 
spiraled upward.60  Estimates suggest that more than 10,000 people died of 
tainted booze during Prohibition.61    
Prohibition ended with the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment 
on December 5, 1933.62  In New Orleans, as the story goes, the occasion 
was honored with 20 minutes of celebratory cannon fire.63  According to 
another apocryphal tale, President Franklin D. Roosevelt marked the 
occasion by downing a dirty martini.64  Although a few states continued to 
 
 49. Classroom, supra, note 48. 
 50. Rutkin v. Reinfeld, 229 F.2d 248, 255 (2d Cir. 1956). 
 51. Classroom, supra, note 48. 
 52. See Marc Aaron Melzer, Comment, A Vintage Conflict Uncorked: The 21st 
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Fully-Ripened Fight over Interstate Wine and 
Liquor Sales, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 279, 283–84 (2004). 
 53. Classroom, supra, note 48. 
 54. Andrews, supra, note 47. 
 55. Id.   
 56. Prohibition, HISTORY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.history.com/topics/prohibition. 
 57. Id.   
 58. LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE BUREAU OF PROHIBITION 46 (1929).   
 59. Prohibition, HISTORY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.history.com/topics/prohibition. 
 60. Id.   
 61. Andrews, supra, note 47. 
 62. Simpkins v. United States, 78 F.2d 594, 595 (4th Cir. 1935); U.S. CONST. amend. 
XXI.    
 63. Andrews, supra, note 47. 
 64. Id.   
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prohibit alcohol after Prohibition, all had abandoned the movement by 
1966.65  The “noble experiment” failed.66   
Prohibition marks the only time that the states ratified a constitutional 
amendment only to repeal it after experience.67  This unsuccessful foray, 
although initially approved by three-fourths of the states,68 illustrates what 
happens when rights assumed to be retained by the people cease to exist.  
Instead of referring to the epoch as an effective execution of the 
constitutional amendment process, history labels the period as a failure.69  
Prohibition teaches that, when purged of an individual right, people carry 
on as if they still retain the right notwithstanding state action to the 
contrary.  Confidence in governmental institutions erodes, and respect for 
the rule of law falls to a nadir.   
Prohibition demonstrates that worries over underground arsenals, rebel 
uprisings, back-alley abortions, and civil disobedience are realistic if Roe 
and Heller are overruled.  This is not to incite fear or create panic.  Rather, 
the conclusion acknowledges the uneasy lawlessness that suffused 
Prohibition.  If the Supreme Court or a committed three-fourths of the 
states seek to overrule Roe or Heller, they should expect pushback.  
Rebellion and protest are baked into the polity, and taking away previously 
granted rights is a convenient way to stimulate opposition against state 
action.70          
 
IV. WHY COURTS SHOULD HESITATE BEFORE 
CIRCUMSCRIBING PREVIOUSLY RECOGNIZED 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
If past is prologue, Prohibition teaches that courts should be leery 
before circumscribing heretofore recognized individual rights upon which 
society now relies.  Although the argument is handy that overruling Roe 
and Heller returns those issues to the states that position fails to mollify the 
reliance interests built up by individuals who have no desire to relocate at 
the peril of losing something they believe is constitutionally theirs.71  Even 
 
 65. Prohibition, HISTORY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.history.com/topics/prohibition. 
 66. Mills, supra, note 39.   
 67. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, with U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.    
 68. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 69. Mills, supra, note 39.   
 70. See, e.g., NCC Staff, On this day: Shays’  Rebellion was Thwarted, NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTION CENTER (Jan. 25, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/on-this-day-
shays-rebellion-was-thwarted; NCC Staff, The Seeds of Revolution: The Stamp Act Protests 
in Boston, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER (Mar. 22, 2016), http://blog.constitution 
center.org/2016/03/the-seeds-of-revolution-the-stamp-act-protests-in-boston/; Abigail 
Perkiss, The Language of Protest: Race, Rioting, and The Memory of Ferguson, NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTION CENTER (Dec. 3, 2014), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/12/the-
language-of-protest-what-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-ferguson/. 
 71. Christina Cauterucci, Trump Says Without Roe v. Wade, Women Could Just Visit 
Other States for Abortions, SLATE (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/ 
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“[f]or sound adherents of originalism, stare decisis kicks in when erroneous 
precedents—even outrageously erroneous precedents—have created real 
reliance interests that must be taken into account as a matter of proper 
judicial power and due process.”72   
Professor Akhil Reed Amar summarized how reliance on an individual 
right—even one resting on faulty constitutional principles—demands fealty 
by courts when the temptation presents itself to correct the prior case: 
Even those judges and scholars who start with precedents need to 
understand the theory of precedent itself.  Most of today’s most 
important constitutional precedents come from the Warren Court.  
But the Warren Court itself tossed a vast number of precedents out 
the window—on Jim Crow, on malapportionment, on incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights, on organized prayer in the schools, on free 
speech, and on other topics besides.  Was the Warren Court wrong 
to do this?  Any principled advocate of precedent must honestly 
confront this question, yet almost none of our modern jurists or 
scholars has done so. 
Here is my answer:  The Warren Court did the right thing because 
the earlier cases were wrong as an original matter.  The 
Constitution really does promise free speech, a right to an equal 
vote, racial equality, religious equality, and protection against 
violation by state governments of basic fundamental rights.  No 
proper reliance interests stood in the way of righting earlier judicial 
wrongs and giving American citizens what the Constitution in fact 
promised them. Precedent itself requires taking the Warren Court 
seriously, and taking that Court seriously requires taking the 
Constitution itself seriously, which the Warren Court generally did, 
contrary to the view of its many uninformed critics, then and 
now.73  
Chief Justice Earl Warren was no longer on the Court by the time of Roe, 
and he had little to do with Heller.  But the idea is axiomatic that courts 
must confront before overturning precedent the due-process interest of 
settled expectations of individual rights. 
The Supreme Court has defined reliance as “the cost of a rule’s 
repudiation as it would fall on those who have relied reasonably on the 
rule’s continued application.”74  With the same holding true for the right to 
possess a firearm at home in self-defense, “[t]he Constitution serves human 
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neither can the certain cost of overruling Roe for people who have ordered 
their thinking and living around that case be dismissed.”75  To suggest 
otherwise for either Heller or Roe is to ignore the documented plight of 
those impacted, often impecunious individuals unable to afford travel or 
secure alternative means to enjoy previously recognized rights.76   
To measure the cost on reliance, courts reviewing the circumscription 
of individual rights should fall back to what occurred during Prohibition 
when reliance interests were ignored.  Advocates of individual rights 
should press how Prohibition ushered in an era of increased crime, rising 
costs to administer justice, willful disobedience by individuals and state 
actors, and a disproportionate impact on poor communities whose reliance 
interests are most chronic.  Beyond articulating the documented lessons 
from Prohibition, advocates should prepare evidence to demonstrate how 
even the noblest of intentions can go awry when individual rights are 
threatened.  Evidence of what self-help behavior may occur and how that 
behavior could evolve over a prolonged period of time will assist courts in 
understanding how feelings of entitlement to rights and desperation over 
their loss can produce deleterious efforts on society writ large.  Even if the 
individual right is constitutionally suspect, once a right is recognized and 
given to individuals, reliance builds and expectations change.  Expectations 
shape social norms and act as figurative arms-control agreements to 
prevent chaos.77  When the legal premise behind those expectations falters, 
either the conduct continues unlawfully or the social norms careen into 
chaotic tendencies until the status quo is reset.  But, as Prohibition teaches, 
some expectations and reliance interests are never reset.  Remembering a 
right once retained reflexively steers the polity back to the former 
homeostasis. 
V.  CONCLUSION   
When confronted with the prospect of a revolving door of individual 
rights, the Supreme Court made its positon clear:  “Liberty finds no refuge 
in a jurisprudence of doubt.”78  Returning to the question of when an 
individual can feel secure in his or her rights, the answer should always be 
when a reliance interest develops.  It is no constitutional accident that 
Lochner and Plessy represent the only cases in which a conceivable 
argument develops that the Supreme Court upset settled expectations on 
individual rights.  But, in those cases, the settled expectations benefited 
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collective-institutional interests to the detriment of individual welfare.  For 
those hounding to overturn Roe and Heller, the best example of what could 
happen to society lies in Prohibition.  The self-perceived right and 
entitlement to booze became the genesis for lawbreaking and cottage 
industries of unlawful conduct.  Lawyers are the vanguard to prevent 
history from repeating itself.  Once people believe they have a right and 
rely on that right to organize conduct, purging that right exacts a toll on 
society.  The toll is far greater than the moral or political justification to 
preclude someone from drinking, having an abortion, or owning a weapon.  
Advocates in favor of individual rights should present evidence about why 
restraint over valor is prudent before overruling precedent that recognizes 
individual freedoms and liberties.  By winning in court, society loses in the 
aggregate when rights are trampled.   
 
